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AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION: LAW AND
ECONOMICS' TOPICS OF INVENTION AND
ARRANGEMENT & TROPES OF STYLE
Michael D. Murray*
ABSTRACT
In the work, The Great Recession and the Rhetorical Canons
of Law and Economics,' the Author examined the role of law
and economics in the Great Recession of 2008 and onward by
examining neoclassical and contemporary law and economics
from the perspective of legal rhetoric. The modern,
neoclassical school of law and economics-often labeled the
"Chicago School"-has had great influence on the American
economy and financial system because of its rhetorical canons:
mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
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and Economics, 58 LOY. L. REV. 615 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Rhetorical Canons
of Law and Economics].
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demonstration; the characterization of legal phenomena as
incentives and costs; the rhetorical economic concept of
efficiency; and rational choice theory as corrected by modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science.2 These canons have made law and economics a
persuasive method of legal analysis and a powerful school of
contemporary legal rhetoric.
This Article continues the critical conversation by focusing
attention on the specific rhetorical topics (topoi) of invention
and arrangement and tropes of style that carry out the
rhetoric of law and economics. With regard to each topic and
trope, the Article will examine the proper, and sometimes
improper or unethical, use of the topic or trope within the
rhetoric of law and economics, and it will discuss the
prescriptive implications of the use of law and economics'
topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in
general legal discourse when evaluated in comparison to the
other schools of classical and contemporary legal rhetoric. My
conclusion is that the topics of invention and arrangement
and tropes of style of law and economics have applications in
legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but the
topics and tropes are subject to abuse and must be used
ethically and with careful regard to their propriety as a tool to
create meaning and inspire imagination, and not as a tool of
deception or obfuscation within the rhetorical situation at
hand.
I. INTRODUCTION
Law and economics is persuasive. The Great Recession 3 is
one by-product of the law and economics movement's ability to
persuade lawyers, legislators, and government officials to
deregulate and remove restraints so as to allow a largely
uninhibited operation of the financial markets and banking
2. Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 630-31,
634-53.
3. The term, 'The Great Recession," is attributed to Nobel Laureate Professor
Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical economic
assumptions when he pointed out that "markets do not work well on their own," and
that, in the recent recession, the United States suffered because the economy lost its
"balance between the role of markets and the role of government." JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY xii (2010). See Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra
note 1, at 617 n.1.
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system.4 My thesis is that if the modes of persuasion of law and
economics are to be used more generally in legal discourse outside
the realm of economic analysis of law, the lessons of the Great
Recession should serve as a cautionary tale, guiding authors
away from uses of these topics and tropes that mislead and
obscure the truth, and toward ethical and responsible uses of the
rhetoric.
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is
persuasive-and not just to legal economists-reveals the
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal
discourse through which to examine the structure and design of
the discourse and as a source of topoi5 and tropes
6 to construct
meaning and to inform and persuade legal audiences. The topoi
and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive thinking about
4. Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 618 n.4.
5. In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = place)
are the "topics" or "subjects" of argument that can be made in various situations.
Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek], which may
be translated as "invention" or "discovery" of the type of argument that will be most
persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio [Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the
argument, which translates as the "arrangement," "organization," or "disposition" of
the contents of the argument. See EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 17, 20 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
CORBETT & CONNORS]; Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in Anglo-Saxon England,
27 ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998).
6. A trope is a use of a word that deviates from the ordinary and principal
meaning or signification of the word. See CORBETT AND CONNORS, supra note 5, at
379. Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio; Greek
lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse, including
grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally id. at 378; Knappe, supra
note 5, at 25-26; Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 129, 133-34 n.2 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory] (collecting sources on style in classical rhetoric).
Figures of speech were divided into tropes (creative variations on the meanings of
words) and schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of words).
Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric" A Place to Stand, 16 J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 51 n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric].
Professors Berger, Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as
metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a
word in two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have
different meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper name
or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name); personification;
hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical question; irony;
onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 395-
409; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 51 n.179. See also MICHAEL R. SMITH,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING
199-248; 328-40 (2d ed. 2008) (metaphors and other tropes) [hereinafter SMITH,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING].
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the law that constructs meaning for the author and the audience.
For many members of the legal writing discourse community-
judges, practitioners, government agencies, and academics-the
modes of persuasion of law and economics can provide a critical
perspective to construct meaning and improve the persuasiveness
of legal discourse generally in content, arrangement, and style.
My goal here is to critically examine the potential of the law
and economics' topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of
style as contemporary legal rhetorical devices in areas of law not
currently served by the economic analysis of law. My goal is not
to critique the neoclassical or contemporary law and economics 7
analysis of law, nor to examine the benefits or costs of the
application of economic analysis in shaping law and social policy.
I seek to examine the potential uses and misuses of the rhetorical
devices of law and economics in general legal discourse, because
the misuse of these devices played a role in bringing about the
Great Recession.
II. LEVELS OF DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY
RHETORIC
Rhetoric, in the most complete sense, is the study of effective
communication.8  Effectiveness in communication is determined
7. As in my prior work, Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics,
supra note 1, at 617 n.2, I use the term "contemporary law and economics" to mean
twenty-first century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-
economic approaches to the study and analysis of law. This shall be distinguished
from "new" or "neoclassical" law and economics that developed in the 1960s and
which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the analysis of
law. New or neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as "traditional" or
"conventional" law and economics. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 (1996); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77,
83, 138 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with
Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2002); Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law
and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 470, 470-72 (2007).
8. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language: On the Function of
Rhetoric for Knowledge, 107 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE AsS'N AM. 348 (1992);
Francis J. Mootz, III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 317
(1999); James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural
and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as
900 [Vol. 58
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by the audience and the situation.9 There may be multiple
audiences. Some are direct targets within the conception and
understanding of the author in preparing the discourse, and
others are indirect receivers of the discourse. The level of
communication, and, thus, the level of rhetoric, applied to the
different audiences is not the same-not every audience will
receive, decode, and draw meaning from the communication at
the same level of understanding.
My prior work 10 developed the theory that law and economics
is a discipline that brings a unique combination of modes of
persuasion to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its
audiences, which I refer to as the four rhetorical canons of law
and economics:"
(1) Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;
(2) The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives
and costs;
(3) The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
(4) Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science. 12
The rhetorical canons of law and economics are employed in
legal discourse through topoi of invention and arrangement and
Rhetoric].
9. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE 1355b (George
A. Kennedy trans., 1991); ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W. Rhys Roberts
trans., Lee Honeycutt ed., 1965), available at http://rhetoric.eserver.org/Aristotle
[hereinafter ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC]; JOHN J. MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN
AUDIENCE: COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND ATTITUDES 9 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE]; KRISTEN K. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC
FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 9
(2009) [hereinafter ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS]; Gerald
Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546
(1990).
10. Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 634-53.
11. Id. at 622, 630-31.
12. The sources consulted to derive these four canons are many and varied, but,
for general reference, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 2, 3,
4, 5, 41-43 (5th ed. 2008) [hereinafter COOTER & ULEN]; POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 7, at 3-4, 9, 13, 21, 24-25, 495-96; Grant M. Hayden &
Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L.
REV. 629 (2007).
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tropes of style. Many of the topoi and tropes of law and economics
operate on a different level of discourse than direct
communication of economic information to expert members of the
economic discourse community. Building on the work of Wayne
C. Booth, the late professor and a leading rhetorician from the
University of Chicago (but not of the Chicago School of
economics), I present the three levels of rhetorical persuasion
that are implicated by the topoi of invention and arrangement
and tropes of style of law and economics:
LEVEL 1 RHETORIC-UNDERSTANDING BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE DISCIPLINE
Level 1 rhetoric (rhetoric-i) is true understanding and
acceptance of the truth of the discourse by members of the
discipline in which the discourse occurs, who are schooled and
knowledgeable in the discipline and its theories. This level of
understanding is reserved to experts in the field.13
LEVEL 2 RHETORIC-ACCEPTANCE OF THE PERSUASIVENESS
OF THE DISCOURSE BY UNDERSTANDING THE RELIABILITY OF
THE SUPPORT
Level 2 rhetoric (rhetoric-2) is not a complete understanding
of the discourse such as the understanding of members of the
discipline of the discourse. Rather, the audiences for rhetoric-2
are receivers or decision-makers who do not completely
understand the doctrine and theories of the discipline of the
discourse. Level 2 reception of the discourse allows the audience
to accept the indicia of truth and reliability of the discourse based
on an understanding of the reliability of the internal sources
supporting the discourse that are used in the discourse, such as
scientific results, scholarly sources, accepted forms of evidence,
and works with known reputations.14 Level 2 reception also
13. See Wayne C. Booth, 1987 Ryerson Lecture: The Idea of a University as Seen
by a Rhetorician (1987), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/-ahkissel/
boothlbooth.htm [hereinafter Booth, Idea of a University].
14. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT xiii,
111 n.18 (1974) (noting the concept of grounds and degrees of belief, and the concept
of finding topoi or loci as the sources or "locations" of provable, warrantable
assumptions). See also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert
Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court
Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1128 n.44, 1156 n.170, 1161-62 (2008)
(quoting Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses:
Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49
902 [Vol. 58
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allows the audience to determine the reliability of sources
external to the discourse that support the discourse, such as the
character and testimony of trusted recommenders, and the
observation of peer-acceptance of the work and the author by
members of the same discipline who presumably have rhetoric-1
understanding of the material.15 The acceptance of the reliability
of the supporting sources allows for persuasion of the truth and
reliability of the discourse even without fully understanding the
discourse.16
LEVEL 3 RHETORIC-PERSUASION BY THE INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE DISCOURSE
The third level of rhetoric (rhetoric-3) again is one in which
the audience of decision-makers does not completely understand
the truth of the discipline and its theories, but the audience
observes the internal consistency and logic, and how the
discourse tracks under the evaluation of the design and execution
of the discourse.17 Level 3 receivers will evaluate a discourse by
asking questions such as: Do the methods used appear to be
sound? Does the author appear to be competent in employing
those methods? Is the end product logical and internally
consistent?"8 An example would be the evaluation of a scholarly
journal article to determine if the author appears to be competent
and the writing consistent with the standards for scholarly
inquiry and discourse within the academy or within one
HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1143-44 (1998)) ("[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though
not cast in the elegant form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert
testimony, even that based on natural or social science, is argumentation, made for,
and in, a unique context-the law.").
15. Booth, Idea of a University, supra note 13, at 12-13.
16. Id. Professor Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity,
85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 115 (2006) (citing 1 JQRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 42, 286-87, 305 (orig. ed. 1981; Thomas McCarthy trans.,
(1984)) (describing the communication theory of Jiirgen Habermas that depends
upon the existence of communicative action in discourse to "reach understanding" or
"communicatively achieved agreement."). Communicative action persuades by using
a set of "validity claims." Habermas, supra note 16, at 75, 308. News reporting of
world events may make a "constative" utterance whose claim to validity is truth. Id.
at 309. Storytelling and narrative reasoning may be considered "expressive"
utterances whose claim to validity is rooted in nothing more than sincerity. Id. at
174, 325-26. "Regulative" utterances have a claim to validity of "rightness." Id.
Participants to communicative action can either accept these validity claims or
subject them to criticism and demand justification. Id. at 99.
17. Booth, Idea of a University, supra note 13, at 13-14.
18. See id.
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institution as a whole.1 9 Another way that Level 3 receivers
might evaluate a discourse is by determining whether the author
displays the proper ethos of her role in the creation of the
discourse.2 °
In making recommendations for legal discourse based on the
rhetoric of law and economics, I will mention the level of rhetoric
of the device employed. In many instances, it will not be
rhetoric-1 discourse, that which, for instance, an economist would
aim to achieve when communicating with other economists, and
law and economics scholars would aim to achieve when
communicating with other law and economics scholars. In most
cases, the rhetorical devices described here will be modes of
19. Booth, Idea of a University, supra note 13, at 13-14.
20. Ethos embodies both moral and intellectual qualities. JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS
AND PATHOS FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 30 (1989). While virtue and high moral
character obviously are concepts relating to the advocate's ethics and morality, the
concept of practical wisdom suggests that the audience must perceive the advocate's
reasoning as sound, not simply from a formal, logical standpoint, but in a broader
sense of perceiving that the advocate possesses credibility and common sense. See
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. II, ch. 1, at 1378a; WISSE, supra note
20, at 30. The concept of good will indicates that the advocate should evince good
will and benevolence toward the audience as opposed to a spirit of malice revealed
through attempted deception, obfuscation, or self-aggrandizement. ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. II, ch. 1, at 1378a; CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5,
at 72-73; WISSE, supra note 20, at 30-33. Classical rhetoric focused as much on
projecting the right moral character as in possessing it. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra
note 5, at 72; WISSE, supra note 20, at 31; Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 100-01 (1994) [hereinafter Frost, Ethos, Pathos &
Legal Audience]. "[A] person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily
persuasive to the hearers." ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. II, ch. 1, at
1378a (emphasis added). Good moral character can be projected through the
discourse itself; it is not necessary that the advocate possess a widely-known
reputation for uprightness and good moral character when entering into the
proceedings or that the advocate self-consciously point out aspects and examples of
his own good character in the discourse (although those means are recognized as
being available to the advocate in proper circumstances if handled with appropriate
delicacy). See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 72-73; Frost, Ethos, Pathos &
Legal Audience, supra note 20, at 100-01. The ethical appeal has particular
importance in legal discourse because the modes of persuasion through enthymemes
and examples present arguments based on probability, not certainty of proof.
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 72. Thus, it matters dearly when the
audience weighs the persuasiveness of arguments and counter-arguments based on
probability that the audience perceive the advocate as credible and believable,
"possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character." Id. (quoting 3 MARIUS
FABIUS QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA sec. viii at 13 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954))
[hereinafter QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA]. The slightest lapse in good sense,
good will, or moral integrity might turn the audience away from acceptance of the
arguments. Id. at 73.
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persuasion at the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 levels of persuasion:
persuasiveness based on the reliability of the support
demonstrated in the rhetoric, or persuasiveness based on the
internal logic and methodology-in short, the ethos-of the
discourse.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RHETORICAL CANONS
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Each of the four canons of law and economics are used both
as topics of invention and arrangement and as tropes of style in
persuasive discourse. The four canons of law and economics
rhetoric interact together at the same time and toward the same
audience. Proper economic discourse incorporates each canon for
the persuasion of the audience. There is a connection and
interaction in the discourse of each canon to the others that
influences the persuasion of the audience-one cannot alter or
abandon the canons of efficiency, mathematical and scientific
certainty, response to incentives, and even rational choice
without affecting the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the
economic discourse. An incorrect, overstated, or deceptive
message regarding one canon puts the others at risk of suspicion
or rejection by the audience.
In modern argument theory,21 the author of the discourse
(Speaker) codes the discourse (Message) for a particular receiver
(Audience) according to the conditions, requirements, and
limitations of the context of the discourse (Situation). In law and
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker's purpose is most
21. Basic sources on modern argument theory are: JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY
G. AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW, chs. 2-3, 6-7 (2002) [hereinafter BRUNER &
AMSTERDAM]; CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC:
A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)
[hereinafter PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA]; STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO
REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND CONTEMPORARY
DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate
Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance
Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007) (discussing the corporate metaphor in
modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation
Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law,
2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004) (describing the use of metaphor in
modern argument theory and cognitive studies); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note
6, at 139; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. AS'N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80-81 (2009).
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closely aligned with the canon of Efficiency. The Message to
achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of Incentives
and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience according
to the Rational Choice Theory, and the means used are chosen in
reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct preference for
the methods of Mathematics and Science. Therefore, in my prior
work, I depicted the flow of the discourse by which each canon
feeds into and simultaneously draws from the other canons, in
alignment with the components of modern argument theory, as
follows:









& STYLE & STYLE
The diagram indicates the rhetorical modes I discuss in
Part IV, which are used as topics of invention and arrangement
as tropes of style:
(1) Mathematics and Science,
(2) Incentives and Costs,
(3) Efficiency, and
22. Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 633-34.
[Vol. 58
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(4) Rational Choice.
IV. THE TOPICS AND TROPES OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS AND THE LEVELS OF RHETORIC IN
WHICH THEY OPERATE
A. RHETORIC-1-2-3 USES OF MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE AS
TOPICS OF INVENTION AND ARRANGEMENT AND AS A TROPE OF
STYLE
Under contemporary legal rhetoric's modern argument
theory, rhetoric is the practice of crafting discourse for the
audience and the situation.23 Modern argument theory confronts
the problem of the indeterminacy of language.
24 The linguistic
limitations of indeterminacy mean that arguments are not
provable in the absolute unless the language used is determinate
enough for absolute proof-at least "proof' within the language of
that discipline-such as the language of mathematics and formal
logic. 25  Outside the realms of mathematics and formal logic,
language is only determinative of probabilities of meaning, so
that, when the discourse extends beyond pure mathematics and
formal logic, argumentation depends on the construction of the
most reasonable and probable argument that can be made in the
social situation or institutional setting.26  The argument is not
23. See generally KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 41-44 (1950)
[hereinafter BURKE, RHETORIC OF MOTIVES]; CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF
RHETORIC 9-10 (William Kluback trans., Notre Dame 1982) [hereinafter PERELMAN,
REALM OF RHETORIC]; PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 4, 15-21,
62, 85; TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 21, 16-17, 141; STEPHEN
E. TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT 7, 96, 100-01, 118-19, 123-27 (2003) [hereinafter
TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT]; Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. &
RHETORIC 6-8 (1968), available at
http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/-davis/crs/E398t/Bitzer-Rhetorical%20Situation.pdf
[hereinafter Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation]; Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, "To Say What
the Law Is" Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861, 875-80
(1995) [hereinafter Greenhaw, To Say].
24. See generally BRUNER & AMSTERDAM, supra note 21, at chs. 2-3, 6-7;
PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 4, 15-25; FRANS H. VAN
EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 21; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at 139.
25. See generally PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC, supra note 23, at 9-23;
PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 15-25; TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION
TO REASONING, supra note 21, at 271-74; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at
139.
26. See generally PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21, at 4, 15-21,
62, 85; TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 21, at 16-18, 271-74;
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offered as incontrovertible proof, but instead as the most
reasonable and probable outcome that can be advocated in the
situation.
Invention and arrangement are topics of rhetoric that
directly confront the rhetorical problem of composing language to
impart meaning to an audience and to persuade that audience in
a particular situation. Within these topics, Aristotle divided
modes of argument into two parts: (1) the modes of argument and
persuasion that are invented or created by the author-the
entechnic pisteis, "artistic" or "artificial," proofs known as logos,
pathos, and ethos; 28 and (2) the modes of argument and
persuasion that the author does not or cannot invent, but that are
discovered or found-the atechnic pisteis or "non-artistic" or "non-
artificial" proofs, including facts and data, statistics and reports,
documents and contracts, sworn testimony (including expert
testimony), interviews, polls, and surveys.29
1. INVENTION
Invention describes the means to create, devise, and conceive
of persuasive discourse.3 ° The term "invention" is a translation of
the Latin inventio and carries the same meaning as the Greek
term for invention or discovery, heuristic (EupErucij). 31
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at 139.
27. See generally PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 21; TOULMIN,
USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 23. In the legal arena, this theory accepts the fact
that the advocate has a client whose facts and legal situation are not necessarily the
best possible circumstances for a person legally to be involved in; nevertheless, the
advocate must offer the most reasonable, probable, and compelling argument in
support of his or her client's position that can be raised in the situation, with the
hope that the decision-maker will find the argument more reasonable and compelling
than the opponent's arguments. Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at 139 (citing
Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566,
567 (1994)).
28. See, e.g., SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 6, at 10-25.
29. See THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990);
Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108,
118-21 (1993) [hereinafter Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor]; Fred A.
Simpson & Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts-Aristotle and
the Rules of Evidence, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003).
30. Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 617 (1999) (noting the invention or discovery of available
means of argument) [hereinafter Frost, Lost Heritage]; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman
Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 107, 110 (1992)
[hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis].
31. See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 48; Translation of "Heuristic" in
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The canon of invention serves as a reminder to authors of
legal discourse to consider the available means of persuasion and
the interaction of the modes chosen so as not to leave out
available means or employ self-contradictory or self-defeating
means. The classical rhetoricians did not consider this canon to
be a list of required elements of argument. 2 Ideally, the classical
rhetorical topic of invention should be used to craft a discourse to
persuade through logos,33 a logical exposition of the argument, as
well as by revealing the competence and integrity of the author to
handle the exposition itself (ethos),34 and inspire emotions that
put the audience in a frame of mind to be persuaded by the
argument (pathos),35 by using the non-artificial facts and evidence
made available by the rhetorical situation.
Classical rhetoric simultaneously follows three paths toward
the goal of persuasion: ethos (persuasion accomplished through
the perceived character or reputation of the speaker),
6 pathos
(persuasion accomplished through the emotional response of the
audience to the communication),37  and logos (persuasion
accomplished through logical reasoning embodied in the content
of the communication). 3' The interaction of the three paths of
persuasion may be depicted as a "rhetorical triangle" similar to
the "communication triangle" discussed in contemporary
rhetorical theory39 (see diagram below):
English?, HOW TO SAY, http://howtosay.org/enen/Heuristic (last visited Jan. 2,
2011). "Heureka," a/k/a "eureka," is "I have found (it)," the first person, singular,
perfect active indicative form of heuriskein, the Greek verb "to find." See Eureka,
Heuristic +, ENGLISH-WORD INFORMATION, WORD INFO ABOUT ENGLISH
VOCABULARY, http://wordinfo.info/unit/781?letter=E&spage=6 (last visited Jan. 2,
2011).
32. See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 30, at 617-18; Frost, Greco-Roman Legal
Analysis, supra note 30, at 127.
33. See SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 6, at 10-25.
34. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 71-77; GEORGE A. KENNEDY,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO
MODERN TIMES 68, 75 (1980) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC]; William
A. Covino & David A. Joliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC: CONCEPTS,
DEFINITIONS, BOUNDARIES 52 (1995) [hereinafter Covino & Joliffe].
35. Covino & Joliffe, supra note 34, at 17; CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at
77-84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra note 34, at 68.
36. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JACLYN LUTZKE & MARY F. HENNGELER, THE RHETORICAL TRIANGLE:
UNDERSTANDING AND USING LOGOS, ETHOS AND PATHOS (2009), available at
http://www.iupui.edu/-uwc/pdf/Rhetorical%20Triangle.pdf. See also JAMES L.
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In this conceptualization, the three paths of persuasion flow
into one another. The logos of the argument affects the pathos in
the audience and simultaneously affects the perception of the
ethos of the author. The pathos of the audience members affects
how they perceive the ethos of the author and how they receive
the logos of the argument.
2. ARRANGEMENT
The classical rhetorical topic of arrangement (Latin
dispositio; Greek taxis) pertains to the order and design of the
discourse for persuasive effect.40  Arrangement is driven by
context and purpose. The proper and persuasive arrangement of
discourse depends on the speaker, the speaker's purpose, the
setting or situation, the characteristics of the speaker's audience,
and the audience's purpose, desire, or motivation. 4' As a starting
point, the classical rhetoricians developed a complex paradigm for
arguments that still is applied in court rules4 2 for trial and
appellate briefs: Exordium (introduction or statement of the
issues presented), Narratio (statement of the case), Partitio
KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE 19 (1980); Levine & Saunders, Thinking like a
Rhetor, supra note 29, at 114-15; Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40
Sw. L.J. 1089, 1091-93 (1986).
40. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 20; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra
note 6, at 50; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 30, at 618-19; Frost, Greco-Roman
Legal Analysis, supra note 30, at 123-27.
41. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 20; MICHAEL H. FROST,
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC 4, 34, 35 (2005) [hereinafter FROST,
CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC]; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 50.
42. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 14, 24; see FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC, supra note
41, at 45; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 50.
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(summary of the argument), Confirmatio (argument), and
Peroratio (conclusion).43
As with the other canons of rhetoric, arrangement is
considered to be of high importance to the persuasiveness of the
discourse. Sloppy, disorderly, or impenetrable arrangements
defeat access to the demonstration of the workings of the
argument, deny falsifiability, distract the audience's attention
from the communication of the discourse, and deflate the
audience's reception and reaction to the argument. All of this
prevents persuasion.
As with the topic of invention, arrangement operates
through the two previously mentioned modes of logos-oriented
communication and persuasion: the entechnic pisteis (Artistic)
Modes and the atechnic pisteis or (Non-Artistic) Modes. Put
simply, artistic modes of invention or arrangement are created
(drafted, composed, or imagined) by the author, while non-artistic
modes are not created by the author, but are found or identified
by the author and employed in the discourse in furtherance of the
author's goals. Mathematical and scientific methods of invention
and arrangement are found in both artistic and non-artistic
modes of logos-oriented communication and persuasion.
3. THE ENTECHNIC PISTEIS (ARTISTIC) MODES OF LOGOS IN
MATHEMATICAL AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS OF INVENTION
AND ARRANGEMENT
Mathematics and science already tread the logos pathway to
persuasive discourse through the logical deductive structure of
the syllogism4 4 and the logical inductive structure of the
43. See FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC, supra note 41, at 45. The dispositio
of the argument also may contain refutatio, the making and meeting of counter-
arguments. In De Inventione, Cicero named six parts: exordium, narratio, partitio,
confirmatio, reprehensio (refutation, counter-argumentation), and conclusio
(conclusion). MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE INVENTION Esec. 1.19 at 41 (H.M.
Hubbell trans., 1949) [hereinafter CICERO, DE INVENTIONE]. The Rhetorica ad
Herennium names six parts of dispositio: exordium, narratio, divisio (summary,
breakdown of arguments), confirmatio, confutatio (counter-argumentation), and
conclusio. CICERO, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM § 1.3 (H. Caplan trans., Harv. U.
Press 1954). See Russ Ver Steeg & Nina Barclay, Rhetoric and Law in Ovid's
Orpheus, 15 L. & LITERATURE 395, 409-10 n.71, 413 (2003).
44. Deductive reasoning is the process of formation of a major premise or general
proposition and moving to the analysis of a minor premise or specific proposition so
as to draw a conclusion. John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation-Part I:
Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83,
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example. 45  The same forms may be used in invention and
arrangement in rhetoric to construct meaning and to respond to
the expectations of the legal writing discourse community.46
The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms) 47 and the
88-89 (1993); Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra note 30, at 118, 121-23;
Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal
Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (2003) [Robbins, Paradigm Lost]. Aristotle
characterized all forms of deductive reasoning as belonging to the topic of syllogisms.
See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1356. In a legal
argument, a legal rule-a statement of the legal principles that govern a general set
of circumstances-is applied to a new situation-a specific set of facts-to produce a
conclusion about the outcome of this application. MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY
HALLAM DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 8-9 (2009) [hereinafter MURRAY
& DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS].
45. The process of induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its
relationship to a number of other specific propositions that are known to be true. A
certain genus of situations with identifiable characteristics can be defined from a
synthesis of known situations ("species" of situations, or "precedents") that all share
these characteristics. See Christ of Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric §§ 5(C), 7.4, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2002 ed.),
available at http://plato.stanford.edularchives/sum2002/entries/aristotle.rhetoric/.
Aristotle called a rhetorical induction an "example." ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC,
supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b; Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal
Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 752 n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The
Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the Development of Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367,
372-73 (1999).
46. The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal discourse
and rhetoric derived from the classical tradition, in which there are two permitted
logical structures for an argument, the deductive and the inductive. ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1356b; CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note
43, at 93; QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 20, at 149-53. The forms
for effective legal discourse, as opposed to mathematical, scientific proof, were the
deductive, syllogistic rhetorical form known as an enthymeme, and the inductive
rhetorical form known as an example or paradigm argument. ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b. See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY,
ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 40 n.49 (1991). Aristotle
believed the enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms. ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b.
47. In the deductive structure, both syllogisms and enthymemes begin with a
major premise and follow with a minor premise so as to produce a conclusion. The
difference between the two forms is that in a true syllogism each major premise must
be a true statement of absolute certainty, and the minor premise also must be a true
statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is absolutely, irrefutably true.
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 38-48. This is referred to by Aristotle as a
"complete proof." ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 9, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1357. In
an enthymeme, the major premise, whether it be explicitly stated or implied in the
enthymeme, must be most probably true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 53
(quoting ARISTOTLE, THE LOGIC: PRIOR ANALYTICS, bk. II, ch. 27); Frost, Lost
Heritage, supra note 30, at 635-36; Michael Frost, Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of
Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J.
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induction and example (inductive forms) 48  are topoi of
arrangement in science, mathematics, and rhetorical
demonstration. 49 By borrowing the structure of mathematics and
science, legal discourse can engage in open demonstration of the
reasoning process in a form that is recognized as authoritative
and persuasive. 50 The structure of the argument takes the form
of logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove the
proposition.5' Focusing on the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 uses of
167, 168 n.6 (2002); Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic
Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 61, 77, 80, 81-84 (2001-2002). In other
words, truth with absolute certainty is not required, only probability of truth.
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 53-54. Similarly, the minor premise must be
most probably true, not absolutely, necessarily true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra
note 5, at 53-54. Corbett and Connor's definition of enthymeme in the Aristotelian
sense is more appropriate for the evaluation of legal discourse than the more limited
definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism where one of the premises,
usually the major premise, is implicit and unstated. Accord EUGENE E. RYAN,
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION 29-34, 36, 38-41 (1984);
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF
EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4-5, 8, 37-38 (1993). As these authors point out, the implicit
major premise is one potential aspect of an enthymeme that would differentiate it
from a true syllogism, but it is not a requirement of every enthymeme. This produces
a conclusion that also is most probably true, but this is acceptable because the
enthymeme's purpose is to persuade, not to establish or define a proposition as a
matter of scientific proof. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 53. See Frost,
Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra note 30, at 110.
48. In daily life, and particularly in the law, a rhetorician infrequently can state
an induction with as much certainty as the above example. Aristotle anticipates this
when he differentiates a rhetorical induction (an "example") from a true induction.
See Scharffs, supra note 45, at 752 n.58. In an example, as in an enthymeme, the
propositions induced by a representative sampling of species of situations (cases or
precedents) are asserted to be true to a high degree of probability, not certainty. See
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b, bk.II, ch. 19, at 1392(a)-1392(b).
49. The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument
is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a. In an
enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the applicable legal principles is
applied to a highly probable construction of the specific circumstances of the case at
hand, so as to describe a highly probable conclusion or prediction about the
application. Id. at bk. I, ch. 1, at 1356b.
50. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 3, 4 (discussing the use of
mathematically precise formulae to support economic theories); Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom, 72
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41-43 (2009). See also Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and
Idealogy, in ARJO KLAMER, DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 38-39 (1988).
51. GEORGE P6LYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF
MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); Donald N. McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752, 763 (1988). The pros and
cons of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing
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mathematical forms and structure, this structure of
argumentation is readily identifiable by audiences, and
communicates a proper logical structure to support the discourse
(rhetoric-2) as well as demonstrating internally consistent work
of a competent author (rhetoric-3).
Induction can inform the major premise of the deductive
structure-the process of development of the rules or standards
through the process of rule synthesis 52  and explanatory
synthesis.53  The deductive structure of the syllogism and
in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009-2010. E.g., Samuel Gregg, An
Economy in Crisis: Law, Policy, and Morality During the Recession: Essay: Smith
versus Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010).
52. Rule synthesis is an inductive synthesis of authorities-including, but not
limited to, judicial opinions-found to be on point and controlling of a legal question
in order to accurately determine and state the prevailing rule of law that governs the
issue. Authorities that control the disposition of a legal issue must be reconciled for
their explicit statements and pronouncements of the governing legal standards as
well as examined for implicit requirements that are induced from the controlling
authorities. See, e.g., MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra
note 44, at chs. 2, 5, 6; MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, ADVANCED
LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY: TRIALS, APPEALS AND MOOT COURT Appx.
(2009) [hereinafter MURRAY & DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING]; RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING chs. 10-13 (5th ed. 2005);
DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING,
REASONING, AND WRITING chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 2007); HELENE S. SHAPO, ELIZABETH
FAJANS & MARILYN R. WALTER, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(V),
ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 2003); Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory
Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 LEGAL COMM. &
RHETORIC 217, 226-29 (2011) [hereinafter Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory
Synthesis]; Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline?
Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (2002). Legal analysis
employs synthesis of the rules to make a single coherent statement of the applicable
legal principles that govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the "R" (Rule)
section of the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the legal reasoning
syllogism. MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at
chs. 2, 5, 6; Michael D. Murray, For the Love of Parentheticals - The Story of
Parenthetical Usage in Synthesis, Rhetoric, Economics, and Narrative Reasoning, 38
U. DAYTON L. REV. (forthcoming, Winter 2013) [hereinafter Murray, Parentheticals],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=21374 17.
53. Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a separate
process of induction of principles of interpretation and application concerning the
prevailing rules governing a legal issue. The induction is from samples-principally
case law-representing specific situations with concrete facts and in which the legal
rules have been applied to produce a concrete outcome. While rule synthesis is the
component of legal analysis that determines what legal standards apply to and
control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to demonstrate and communicate
how these legal standards work in various situations relevant to the legal issue at
hand. Explanatory synthesis is a qualitative method of analysis of legal authorities,
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enthymeme provides the framework for each of the organizational
paradigms of legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and
TREAT.54 The rhetorical logos structures of law and economics
are a highly recommended form for persuasive discourse under
modern argument theory and the contemporary rhetoric theory of
discourse communities. 5 This use of mathematical structure
creates meaning and communicates persuasive discourse to each
possible audience through level 1, 2, and 3 rhetoric.
4. THE ATECHNICPISTEIS OR (NON-ARTISTIC) MODES OF
INVENTION AND ARRANGEMENT OF MATHEMATICS AND
SCIENCE
Mathematics and science play a direct role in contemporary
legal analysis of facts and data, statistics and reports, documents
and contracts, sworn testimony (including expert testimony),
interviews, polls, and surveys. In short, we have come a long way
in the proper presentation of the atechnic pisteis, or non-artistic,
especially precedent cases, and a method of legal rhetoric that uses induction to
formulate from multiple authorities the principles concerning how a legal test or
legal standard is to be interpreted and applied. For background on explanatory
synthesis, see MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 44,
at ch. 6; MURRAY & DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 52, at appx.
A; Murray, Parentheticals, supra note 52, at 7-9; Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis, supra note 52, at 234-40. Legal analysis employs explanatory
synthesis to explain how the applicable legal principles that govern the legal issue at
hand work, and this becomes the "E" (Explanation) section of the discourse, or the
second half of the major premise of the legal reasoning syllogism. MURRAY &
DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at chs. 2, 5, 6; Murray,
Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note 52, at 226, 233-40.
54. IRAC stands for Issue-Rule-Application (or Analysis)-Conclusion. IREAC
stands for Issue-Rule-Explanation-Application-Conclusion. TREAT stands for
Thesis-Rule-Explanation-Application-Conclusion. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010)
(discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse); MURRAY &
DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at chs. 2, 6, 7 (discussing
IRAC and TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism:
Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711,
719-23 (2006) (discussing IRAC); Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis,
supra note 52, at 218, 220, 226, 233-34 (discussing IREAC and TREAT); Robbins,
Paradigm Lost, supra note 44, at 484-87, 492 (discussing IRAC and IREAC).
55. The legal writing discourse community has an expectation that the syllogistic
structures of IRAC, IREAC, or TREAT will be employed; thus, the rhetorical lesson is
not to disappoint this audience with a non-syllogistic structure. See generally Susan
L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is "Logic" Culturally Based? A
Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
157, 164-77 (1997).
Loyola Law Review
modes of invention. In many areas of law-e.g., antitrust law, tax
law, securities law, and the calculation of damages in almost
every area of contract, tort, and property law-mathematical
analysis informs or constructs the substantive elements of the
action-collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or
damages. In addition, at the level of rhetoric-2, the use of
scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for persuasion
regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case-e.g.,
surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of empirical data,
diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant tabular
presentation of data-is a well-established method of persuasion.
In both categories (the direct proof of damages or an element of
the case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of
evidence), the use of science and mathematics is substantive, but
it is also rhetorical because it is employed as a language to
convince the reader that the evidence is reliable or that the
proposition is proved.56
As the chart on the following page demonstrates, the use of
such methods of persuasion has grown over the years:57
56. See Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 29, at 118-21;
Simpson & Selden, supra note 29, at 1011. See also THOMAS M. CONLEY, RHETORIC
IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 280 (1990).
57. Westlaw search "SHOWN DEPICT! DISPLAY! PICTURED REFER! /4
FIGURE GRAPH! CHART TABULAR" with date restrictions for each decade, e.g.,
date(>1999) & date(<2010), in ALLCASES and JLR databases.
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Use of Charts, Tables, and Graphs
9000 -
8000 -








This chart reports a single search in each decade for figures,
charts, graphics, and tabular material. There is no simple way to
control for uses that are proof of elements (such as damages) or
ordering of data and information for persuasion (e.g., evidence).
However, this chart shows that whatever uses are made of
figures, charts, graphs, or tables, those uses are increasing in
cases and law review articles over each decade, and markedly so
in the last two decades in law review and journal articles.
The artistic and non-artistic modes discussed above use
mathematical forms in a substantive manner to communicate
meaning and construct knowledge and understanding. The next
section discusses stylistic uses of mathematical forms that are not
in and of themselves substantive, meaning that the logos-type
communication and understanding of the analysis and the
potential proof of its conclusions achieved through the use of
mathematical or scientific forms is not necessarily the primary
reason for employing mathematical or scientific forms in the
discourse. Instead, the forms are used for style effects in ways
that primarily follow the pathos or ethos pathways of the
communication.
5. RHETORIC-3 USES OF MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE AS A
TROPE OF STYLE
Style (Latin elocutio; Greek lexis) pertains to the composition
IQ
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and wording of the discourse, including grammar, word choice,
and figures of speech. 58  In classical rhetoric, figures of speech
were divided into schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary
arrangements of words), and tropes (creative variations on the
meanings of words).5 9 Style is dependent on the speaker, the
context, the setting, and the audience. The classical rhetoricians
made recommendations for dividing discourse into one of three
levels of style: the low or plain style for the purpose of teaching
the audience (Latin infinum or humile; Greek ischnos), the
middle style for the purpose of pleasing the audience (Latin
aequabile or mediocre; Greek mesos), and the grand style for the
purpose of moving the audience (Latin supra or magniloquens;
Greek adros).°
The audience and the situation for the discourse are, of
course, very important to the analysis of the best arguments that
can be raised,61 so modern argument theory calls for advocates to
pay particular attention to the audience and situation of their
arguments.
Mathematical forms (charts, diagrams, four-quadrant tables,
algebraic formulas) can stimulate thought and imagination,
leading to rhetoric-3 appreciation of the persuasiveness of the
discourse. The following charts offer examples of this
phenomenon.
58. See generally Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at 133-34 n.2 (collecting
sources on style in classical rhetoric); Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, A Call to Combine
Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the Legal Writing Classroom, 50 WASHBURN L.J.
319, 335-36 (2011).
59. Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 51 n.179.
60. See generally Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 30, at 617-19.
61. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 23, at 6-8; Greenhaw, To Say,
supra note 23, at 875-80.
62. Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 6, at 139.
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This chart is intended to report "Ratings Of Challenges
Facing Successful Operations Of A Business In Russia (Among
Selected Major Brandholders And Trademark Owners Doing
Business In Russia)."63  It is offered to demonstrate that
intellectual property protection is perceived to be a primary
challenge confronting international companies doing business in
Russia. 4 The methodology is described in the following way:
In the survey, respondents were asked to rate a series of
"challenges confronting the successful operations of your
business in Russia" using a five-point scale, where one meant
"least important" and five meant "most important." More
than one-half (52%) of selected major brandholders and
trademark owners doing business in Russia gave a rating of
five to intellectual property protection. This ranks
intellectual property protection on virtually the same high
level of concern as customs (54%) and taxes (52%)-which
have historically been perceived as presenting the greatest
challenges to business success in Russia.
65
Nothing in this chart is particularly mathematical except the
fact that the author crunched some numbers to produce the chart,
but the demonstration of the data in a bar graph with a super-
imposed variable line graph makes the presentation all the more
63. The chart was originally published at COALITION FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, http://www.cipr.org/activities/ surveys/top50/index.htm (Jan. 25,




authoritative in a rhetoric-3 sense because it appears that a
complicated mathematical formula was applied to data to produce
this graph.
Example 2:66
Procedure for Acquiring a Firearm in Quebec. Canada
p.0-1
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I consider example 2 to be an excellent use of scientific
charting (taking the form of an informational or decisional flow
chart) to make a rhetorical-3 point: the procedure for acquiring a
firearm in Quebec is too complicated.
66. H. Taylor Buckner, Ph.D., Concordia's "Gun Control" Petition: Ignorance of
the Law is the Only Excuse, TBUCKNER.COM (June 14, 1994),
http://www.tbuckner.com/IGNOLAW.HTM.
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Example 3:67
Google labs Books Ngrm Vlwr
This chart discusses the rise and fall of city names in
English language literature, and claims that this Google Lab
chart reports the results of a search of city names in the vast
amount of literature that Google has scanned and compiled for
searching." The chart purports to tell us something about "the
relative importance of different centers of power in the public
imagination."69 The author could have stated quite simply: when
searching for Paris, London, New York, Boston, and Rome, in the
scanned English literature from 1750 to 2008, interest in London
remained steady and at a higher level than Paris, Boston, and
Rome, while interest in New York started at a very low point but
grew steadily, surpassing London in approximately 1910, and
continued to rise in popularity until 1980, when it began a steady
decline. This would have accurately stated the purported
findings, but the graphing of the information sends a very
different rhetoric-3 message-that something scientific was done
to produce the results the readers see before them.
Mathematical forms are a persuasive tool; but the tool is
only as good as the user, and the user must be careful about
proper uses in proper situations. In general legal discourse, the
67. Erick Schonfield, The Fall and Rise of Twitter in English Literature, TECH





use of law and economics mathematical and scientific forms and
schemes as an artistic or stylistic mode comes with a word of
caution that is grounded in the very discipline from which the
rhetorical use of such forms is drawn: Contemporary law and
economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical primacy of
scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming
hypotheses, designing the methods for testing the hypotheses,
and analyzing the data, statistics, and information collected to
test the hypotheses. 70  Law and economics also assumes the
rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in
discourse to openly demonstrate analyses and reveal its theses
about human behavior for examination and critique. 71  The
rhetorical power of a mathematical proof or a demonstration of a
scientific deduction or induction lies in the openness and
transparency of the demonstration. The premises (major and
minor) and the nature of the hypothesis induced from the
comparison of genus and species of data must be fully disclosed
and described so as to allow the presentation to be analyzed and
rebutted. The assertions made in reference to the information
displayed must be falsifiable. Tautological explication (wherein
the information is presented as self-evident or self-established, or
in simpler terms, that the information is what it is) adds nothing
to meaning or understanding and does not contribute to the mode
of persuasion that points to truth. Using mathematical forms
simply to dazzle or confuse the audience or obfuscate the relevant
information pertinent to the issue is the worst form of trickery
(mere rhetoric, not actual rhetoric). Consider the following chart
of the Obama Health Care Reform initiative:7 2
70. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 7, at 15-16; Richard A.
Posner, Foreword to MICHAEL FAURE & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, ESSAYS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 5 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal
Studies-An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972). See also Thomas Earl
Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and
Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998);
Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611-
12 (1989).
71. See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 57, 59 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).
72. Paul Ibrahim, PAUL IBRAHIM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND MORE BLOG,
http://www.paulibrahim.com/blog/2009/7/16/get-wellsoon-health-care-bureaucracy-
chart.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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One might imagine that the author of this chart did not
intend to make clear the available options offered under the
health care reform initiative.
B. RHETORICAL LESSONS IN DEFINING LEGAL PHENOMENA AS
INCENTIVES AND COSTS
This section discusses: (1) rhetoric-3 uses of incentives and
costs as a trope of style (i.e., a figure of speech using incentives
and costs as a metaphor in discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and
rhetoric-3 concept of incentives and costs in the organization and
presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention and
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).
1. INCENTIVES AND COSTS AS A RHETORIC-3 TROPE OF STYLE
Economics and behavioral science informs legal discourse
and communication by pointing out that people respond to
incentives. Contemporary law and economics, informed by the
lessons of behavioral science, offers a rhetorical perspective on
legal discourse and communication because the study of
persuasion in legal communication involves an analysis of what
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an author (speaker, writer, communicator) can do to create
incentives to attract or motivate the reader (listener, etc.) while
avoiding imposing costs on the reader.
A trope is "a deviation from the ordinary and principal
signification of a word.""3 Metaphor is a trope of style in rhetoric,
one of the figures of speech described and applied within the
canon of style.74 Metaphor is one of the "master tropes," the
others being metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.7 5  Numerous
disciplines have studied the power of metaphor in discourse,
including linguistics, philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology,
and literary theory.76 Recent literary and cognitive studies of
73. EDWARD P. J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 426
(3d ed. 1990).
74. Professor Stephanie A. Gore defines a metaphor as follows:
A "metaphor" is defined as a "figure of speech in which a word or phrase that
ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another, thus making an
implicit comparison." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). A metaphor may also be defined as "an implied
analogy imaginatively identifying one object with another and ascribing to the
first object one or more of the qualities of the second." C. HUGH HOLMAN &
WILLIAM HARMON, A HANDBOOK TO LITERATURE 298 (5th ed. 1986). The
Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics elegantly defines metaphor as "[a]
condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by the
presence of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be enhanced in
vividness, complexity, or breadth of implication." PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POETRY AND POETICS 490 (Ales Preminger ed., enlarged ed. 1974).
Stephanie A. Gore, 'A Rose By Any Other Name" Judicial Use of Metaphors For New
Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 404-05 (2003).
75. BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, appx. D (1945). Burke described the master
tropes as follows: "For metaphor we could substitute perspective; for metonymy we
could substitute reduction; for synecdoche we could substitute representation; for
irony we could substitute dialectic." Id.
76. Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58
MERCER L. REV. 919, 919-20 (2007) (referencing linguistics sources: GEORGE LAKOFF,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with Mark Johnson); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987);
GEORGE LAKOFF, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR
(1989) (with Mark Turner); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK (1996); GEORGE LAKOFF, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark
Johnson); GEORGE LAKOFF, "DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES
AND FRAME THE DEBATE" THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE
LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND VISION
(2006); Philosophy sources: MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with
George Lakoff); MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR
(Mark Johnson ed., 1981); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY
BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); MARK JOHNSON, MORAL
IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1993); MARK
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with George Lakoff); Rhetoric sources: Michael H. Frost,
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metaphor77 have shown that:
Literary analysis and cognitive psychology theory analyze the
use and effect of metaphors in ways that resemble the
techniques of their Greco-Roman counterparts. In some
recent discussions of metaphors' place in legal discourse,
analysts reject the view that metaphors are merely
superficial stylistic devices. They assert, with Haig
Bosmajian, that "it is now well established that the tropes,
especially the metaphor, are not simply rhetorical flourishes
used to embellish discourse."
7 8  Instead, these analysts
maintain that metaphors are essential devices for achieving
certain sorts of intellectual insights. Classical rhetoricians'
recognized that metaphors provide insights or "fresh
knowledge"7 9 that can "scarcely be conveyed"
8 0 by other
means. Under this view, metaphors become important
intellectual components of legal analysis rather than mere
mnemonic or focusing devices.
8 1
Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo warned that "[m]etaphors in law are
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it."
82
Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, in INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL
LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman
Metaphor]; Michael R. Smith, The Power of Metaphor and Simile in Persuasive
Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE
WRITING 179, 179 (1st ed. 2002); Cognitive psychology sources: STEVEN L. WINTER, A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371
(1988); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989); and Literary Theory sources: Michael R. Smith, The
Functions of Literary References in Persuasive Writing.- A Multidisciplinary Analysis,
in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 9, 15-30 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing "Literary References
for Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison").
77. E.g., Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor, supra note 76, at 113, 135-38.
78. Id. at 135 (citing HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 441 (1992)). See also Haig Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors,
Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection to Students and
Teachers, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 438 (1986).
79. Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor, supra note 76, at 136 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 9, at 206).
80. Id. (citing MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE ORATORE 123 (E.W. Sutton trans.,
1942)).
81. Id. at 135-37.
82. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). Thus,
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The rhetorical path that uses incentives and costs as a
metaphor for conditions and effects in the law is a well-traveled
path in legal discourse. 3 Every time an author writes about a
cost-benefit analysis, the use of the term "cost" stands in as a
metaphor, a rhetorical trope that attempts to transfer the concept
of a cost onto the understanding of the actual action or condition
described. The word "benefit" similarly stands in to communicate
a beneficial meaning to the reader concerning the actual effect or
change in condition discussed in the discourse. Every time a
change in the law is said to "incentivize" certain conduct, the
concept of "incentive" is a metaphor for the intention of the actor
to motivate a certain reaction by offering something desired by
the recipient. Every time a license or permit application process
is said to provide a "disincentive" to an activity, the term
"disincentive" is used to convey the negative effects of the
condition described in the discourse. Every time a change in
procedural rules is said to impose an "externality" on the cost of
litigation, the author uses "externality" as a figure of speech to
suggest that the law imposes a cost that is not internalized by one
or more of the parties in the discussion. This is, in fact, a
metaphor within a metaphor-both "cost" and "internalize" are
used metaphorically in this example.
By using the terms "incentives" and "costs" metaphorically,
legal authors can discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives
or costs in contexts that are not necessarily business or contract
settings or do not involve the calculation of pecuniary sums or
damages.8 4  This expansion in language may improve
Judge Cardozo used a metaphor (liberation or enslavement of thought) to criticize
the use of metaphors in law.
83. Note the metaphor I am using here. Metaphors are unavoidable in legal
discourse.
84. In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and
securities law, as well as the calculation of damages in almost every area of law),
mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive element of the action-
collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages. In addition, at the
rhetoric-2 level, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for persuasion
regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case-e.g., surveys, statistical
and quantitative analyses of empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and
four-quadrant tabular presentation of data-is a well-established method of
persuasion. In both categories, the direct proof of damages or an element of the case,
or the persuasive ordering and presentation of evidence, the use is substantive, but it
is employed in a language to convince the reader of the evidence or proof of the
proposition, and thus is rhetorical. See, e.g., Donald N. McCloskey, THE RHETORIC
OF ECONOMICS 92 (1985); Leonard R. Jaffee, Of Probativity and Probability:
Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at Trial, 46 U. PITT. L.
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communication-the enlightening aspect of metaphor in
discourse. Of course, with regard to proper ethos, the
recommendation to use metaphor in rhetoric-3 applications comes
with Judge Cardozo's highly metaphorical warning not to let the
metaphor enslave the reader's thinking on the topic.
2. RHETORIC-2 AND RHETORIC-3 INCENTIVES AND COSTS OF
ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF THE DISCOURSE AS
TOPICS OF INVENTION AND ARRANGEMENT
The economic, rhetorical use of incentives and costs also has
rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 application in the organization and
presentation of the discourse as topics of invention and
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).
Contemporary law and economics informs contemporary
rhetorical studies of invention, arrangement, and style, adding to
the knowledge base of studies of writing as a process and
discourse community theory. The rhetorical perspective of
economics and behavioral science informs the study and
understanding of effective legal communication by demonstrating
the means by which an author can create incentives to attract or
motivate the reader while avoiding imposing costs on the reader.
For example, authors can create incentives in legal
communication and avoid transaction costs by making
compositional choices through the use of a helpful, reader-
oriented, organizational paradigm such as the TREAT
paradigm.85 Authors can create incentives and avoid costs in
legal communication by organizing the contents of
communications into a rule formation (rule section) and a
separate explanation of how the rule works (explanation
section).8 6 Authors can create incentives and impose costs in
legal communication by using explanatory synthesis to synthesize
the work of authorities used to demonstrate both the legal rules
that govern the issue and how those legal rules work in actual,
concrete situations.
8 7
REV. 925, 937-38, 1018, 1097-81 (1985) (critiquing use of statistical evidence in
litigation); Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 29, at 118-21;
Simpson & Selden, supra note 29, at 1011.
85. MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at
ch. 6.
86. Id.
87. See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note 52, at 145-
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C. RHETORICAL USE OF EFFICIENCY IN LEGAL DISCOURSE
As specifically applied to the rhetorical canons of invention,
arrangement, and style, the rhetorical perspective of economics
and behavioral science can inform the discussion by
demonstrating that efficiency supports the persuasiveness of
legal discourse.
1. RHETORIC-3 USE OF EFFICIENCY IN INVENTION AND
CREATION OF MEANING
Economic or productive efficiency is the application of the
term "efficiency" that is best known to non-economists. The
advice for legal authors seeking rhetoric-3 recognition of the
meaning of the term when used outside of strict economic
analysis is to use the term "efficiency" or "efficient" to refer to an
avoidance of waste, a reduction in costs (transaction costs,
collateral costs, or externalities), or other savings in time or
money that have been or would be brought about by a change in
the law. Saving money or time is nearly universally valued as a
goal in life and in the law. Emphasis of efficiency-the phrasing
and defining of elements of the circumstance in terms of efficiency
in the time or cost saving sense-is rhetorically valuable.
2. RHETORIC-2 AND RHETORIC-3 EFFICIENCY IN
ARRANGEMENT AND STYLE
Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the
form, structure, and composition of economic discourse. This
lesson from the canons of law and economics teaches legal
authors to follow a prescription to make their discourses clear,
concise, succinct, and elegant in form. The formal use of the term
"efficiency" benefits clarity and promotes comprehension of
meaning over confusion and frustration. It opens doors to
falsifiability because the material is more accessible for analysis
and criticism if it is clear and succinct. The door to falsifiability
is closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation in legal
discourse. Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted are highly
persuasive.
D. RHETORICAL LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY
The lessons for rhetorical discourse using the definition of
rational choice in contemporary law and economics have become
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more complicated as our understanding of human behavior
grows, but the consequences of the contemporary theories of
rational choice ultimately coincide with lessons learned from
classical rhetoric and modern studies of cognition and brain
science. Discussed below are the rhetorical lessons of
contemporary rational choice theory in three areas: (1) rhetoric-1
framing of legal issues to respond to biases and heuristics and to
situational conditions on rational choice as a mode of invention
and arrangement; (2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and
invention (synthesis and syllogistic structure) to appeal to the
rational audience; and (3) rhetoric-3 uses of pathos-centric modes
of argument-metaphor, parable/mythical/fable forms, character
archetypes, and other forms of narrative reasoning-as topics of
invention and tropes of style to address anchoring, endowment
effects, and other heuristics and biases of legal audiences based
on the lessons of pathos from modern cognitive studies and brain
science.
1. THE RHETORIC-1 IMPORTANCE OF FRAMING IN INVENTION
AND ARRANGEMENT
It is challenging to manage the modeling and framing of
broad concepts such as fairness and justice in economic theory,
but the rhetorical implications of the empirical observations in
law and economics, cognitive studies, and brain science reveal
that people respond to justice and fairness in legal discourse.
These studies confirm what the advocates of the simultaneous
use of the modes of persuasion of logos, ethos, and pathos have
predicted: that arguments framed from a more general
perspective of how the laws and the public policies behind the
laws support the arguments are a necessary part of legal
discourse, and that a legal author can draw on narrative theory to
further the communication through pathos that implicates the
values and emotional appeal of the discourse as communicated to
the audience.
Other theories developed through empirical testing of
rational choice biases and heuristics with a predictable effect on
decision-making-such as the endowment effect, the status quo
bias, and risk/loss aversion-can be used to frame arguments.
For example, there are two lessons to be learned from the
experiments of behavioral science: (1) the experiments indicate
that framing of choice matters because decision-making is
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context-based;s8 and (2) the experiments indicate that the
endowment effect or status quo bias plays a strong role in
contract negotiation. 9 These two lessons can be combined to
create a rhetorical prescription for advocates: advocates should
work to carefully and advantageously define the starting point
terms of a negotiation (which will, as indicated by the
experiments, be perceived and responded to as the status quo)90
or the status of the current law from which the tribunal must
move forward to adjudicate the client's matter (which, again, will
be perceived as the status quo),91 and simultaneously work to
frame the choices of departure in such a way that the preferred
outcome for a client is framed as an appropriate compromise
choice-not the most extreme or most expensive departure from
the status quo starting positions (as defined by the advocate), but
not the smallest departure either. 92
2. RHETORIC-1 AND RHETORIC-2 LOGOS TOPICS OF
ARRANGEMENT AND INVENTION (INDUCTIVE SYNTHESIS
AND SYLLOGISTIC STRUCTURES) FOR THE RATIONAL
AUDIENCE (THE LEGAL WRITING DISCOURSE COMMUNITY)
The overall structure of legal discourse, both in terms of
invention and arrangement, should be drafted with regard to the
logos topics of syllogistic structure and inductive synthesis. The
rhetoric-1 audience of legal discourse is made up of legally-
trained readers-the legal writing discourse community. The
expectations of this group manifestly support using a logical
syllogistic structure for the overall architecture of the discourse,
and the Anglo-American theory of precedent and stare decisis
support the inductive structure of a synthesis of authorities to
determine the legal standards governing an issue. The lessons of
modern cognitive studies and brain science that challenge many
of the assumptions, premises, and paradigms of traditional
rational choice theory in law and economics do not wipe the slate
88. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-5 (2000) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS]; Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, &
Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in SUNSTEIN,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 61-62, 73-74, 76.
89. Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation and Contract
Law, in SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 88, at 116-19, 120-
21, 136-38.
90. Id. at 136.
91. Id. at 137.
92. Kelman, Rottenstreich, & Tversky, supra note 88, at 74-76.
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clean from the expectations of the legal writing discourse
community and its basic conventions for organization and
demonstration. Even if indirect audiences are contemplated, in
rhetoric-2 persuasion, the logical syllogistic structure is a widely
accepted method of demonstration. If used properly with
appropriate attention to the ethos of the discussion, the structure
opens up the premises and evidence of the discussion to
examination, potential criticism, and rebuttal. A proper
synthesis identifies the species that are examined as well as the
newly identified genus principles that are induced from the
species, or it identifies the existing genus principles that are
applied to the newly identified species of the genus, depending on
which side of the induction the discussion falls. In short, in
invention and arrangement, there is no ready substitute for the
logical syllogistic structure of legal discourse and the inductive
structure of synthesis.
3. RHETORIC-3 RATIONAL CHOICE LESSONS CONCERNING
PATHOS-BASED MODES OF PERSUASION TO ADDRESS
COGNITIVE AND SITUATIONAL EFFECTS ON DECISION-
MAKING
A significant part of contemporary law and economics'
rational choice theory is under examination to challenge the
assertion that legal decision-makers are autonomous individuals
weighing costs and benefits in individualistic terms, unaffected
by context and situation. Under the traditional and still
prevailing doctrine of rational choice, rational decision-making
should not be affected by situation, meaning that choices that
maximize the decision-makers' ends should not be affected by
situation. The values and interests implicated by a choice may be
different from individual to individual, but, once identified, the
choices made in recognition of the same values and interests
should not change from situation to situation. Cognitive studies
and brain science on situational decision-making take the
opposite position based on empirical evidence and argue that
decisions are affected by biases and heuristics that are connected
to the context and situation of the decision-making.
9 3
93. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 129, 142-43 (2003); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra
note 7, at 77, 83, 138; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'Perfect Rationality
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67, 105-09 (2002).
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Cognitive studies and brain science have worked a similar
correction in contemporary rhetoric's modern argument theory:
the assumptions and premises of classical and traditional
theories of rhetoric regarding audience have been refined by
modern social science and cognitive studies that redefine the
concept of the rhetorical situation in a way that affects every part
of persuasive discourse-the audience, the message, and the
speaker.94 The lessons learned in both contemporary law and
economics and contemporary rhetoric can inform both disciplines
to improve theories, predictions, and prescriptions about changes
in economic analysis of law and legal discourse.
Situational decision-making often implicates the different
values that people assign to different choices depending on the
context and situation in which the decision is to be made,9 and a
rhetorical examination of values leads to the analysis of
pathos96-the emotional response to persuasive discourse97-
94. See, e.g., MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE, supra note 9, at 9; ROBBINS-
TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, supra note 9, at 9; Bitzer, The Rhetorical
Situation, supra note 23, at 6-8; White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 8, at 695;
Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra note 9, at 1546.
95. Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 n.24, 614-15, 625-26, 644-45 (2003); Jack L.
Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 171 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000); Mitchell, supra note 93, at 101-10, 160-64. See also Itamar Simonson & Amos
Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J.
MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992); Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-
Dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1179 (1993).
96. Pathos is one of the three artistic topoi of invention-an essential mode of
persuasion in classical rhetoric. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 99 (Thomas 0.
Sloan ed., 2001); Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent Posner-Style: Judge Richard A.
Posner's First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward an Aesthetics of
Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REV. 73, 158 (2004). Quintilian put great stock
in emotional appeals, Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 20, at 91,
claiming that, "this emotional power... dominates the court[;] it is this form of
eloquence that is queen of all." 2 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 20,
at 419. Quintilian, like Aristotle, thought that "the duty of the [advocate] is not
merely to instruct: the power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals." Id. at
139; see Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 20, at 91. Over-reliance
on the logos, the logical presentation, of an argument may be a myopic tendency of
lawyers, but it is likewise clear that pathos cannot be controlled directly by legal
argument. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 78. See also Kenneth D. Chestek,
Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 3, 5, 29-30 (2010) (detailing an empirical study of the
persuasiveness of logos-centric versus pathos-centric briefs). The classical
rhetoricians recognized that our emotions are not entirely under the control of our
will and our intellect. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 78. We cannot use
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because values in contemporary brain science appear to be the
most important trigger of emotional conviction." Contemporary
rhetoric encompasses examination and consideration of the
values, passions, and biases of the audience in its study of the use
of practical reasoning and informal logic, narrative reasoning
logic to argue an audience into an emotional state any more than we can will
ourselves into an emotional reaction based on an intellectual conviction that we
should have a certain emotional reaction to a certain set of facts or a particular
logical appeal. See id. An advocate that explicitly announces that he or she will play
on the audience's emotions in the presentation of the discourse will inevitably
achieve the opposite result; the audience, made wary of emotional manipulation, will,
at best, steel themselves not to be manipulated, and, at worst, will discount the
advocate's presentation on the grounds that the advocate has engaged in trickery
and subterfuge. See id. at 78-79. Thus, the advocate must not openly play upon the
audience's heart strings, but instead must carefully and subtly arrange the facts and
narrative reasoning of the case in conjunction with the logic and legal reasoning of
the argument. See id.; Chestek, supra note 96, at 2, 3, 5, 29-32; Frost, Ethos, Pathos
& Legal Audience, supra note 20, at 94.
97. See, e.g., John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation-Part I:
Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83,
92 (1993); D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 57, 59 (1997). See also EMOTIONS, COGNITION AND
BEHAVIOR 112 (Carroll E. Izard et al. eds., 1984); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHIED, THE
MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983); Carroll E. Izard,
HUMAN EMOTIONS (1977).
98. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE
FEELING BRAIN 54 (2003); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION,
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 96-97, 170-75, 250 (1994) [hereinafter DAMASIO,
DESCARTES' ERROR]. See also RAYMOND ROSS, UNDERSTANDING PERSUASION 7 (3rd
ed. 1990); Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 28; Robert F. Blomquist, The
Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer?, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 93, 114, 133 (2009); Kathryn
M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal
Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381 (2008); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of
Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. L. REV. 411, 412-19 (2006).
Damasio describes the brain process of somatic marking, which is used to
evaluate experience of the world, tagging certain facts as useful and valuable toward
an objective, and rejecting many others. In decision-making, such as the task of
jurors, the process involves the somatic marking of evidence for its salience toward
the decision, winnowing down the possible choices and their consequences based on
the somatic marker (loosely characterized as a "gut feeling") assigned to the
evidence. (Contemporary legal economists and behavioral scientists would
characterize this as the application of affect heuristics.) E.g., Melissa L. Finucane et
al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 1, 2 (2000). Jurors then seek a narrative that makes sense fitting the
marked evidence into a coherent, lifelike, believable story. Jurors can supply their
own narrative, or the advocate can supply a lifelike, believable storyline that fits the
facts (and assists the client), which emphasizes the need for storytelling as a tool of
narrative reasoning in legal discourse. See generally DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR,
supra note 98, at 170-75; Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1609, 1628, 1631-33 (2007).
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(and its many sub-categories-storytelling, mythical forms,
parable forms, hero-antihero archetypes), and the schemes and
tropes of composition in analogical and literary forms (e.g.,
schemes and figures of speech, metaphor theory, and literary
allusion).99 Contemporary law and economics describes the same
type of phenomena as biases and heuristics-anchoring, status
quo bias, endowment effect bias, risk/loss aversion,
representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and
probability assessment dysfunctionality.100  Contemporary
rhetoric applies cognitive studies and brain science to inform the
predictions of audience reaction and motivation produced by the
use of certain topics of invention or tropes of style,1 °1 much in the
99. See, e.g., SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 6, at ch. 3; Kenneth
D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEG. WRITING 127 (2008);
Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal
Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (2001); Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in the
Law: Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010); Linda H.
Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal
Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 7 (1996); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins,
Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write
Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001); Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes
from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEGAL WRITING 229 (2006); J. Christopher Rideout,
Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING 53
(2008); Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin: Telling the
Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey,
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006).
100. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471-1550 (1998); Russell Korobkin,
Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in SUNSTEIN,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 88, at 116-43; Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1076-78 (2000); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories, supra note 7, at 1499-1540; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124,
1128-30 (1974).
101. For example, the evaluation of the use of metaphor as a method of pathos-
based persuasion and transmission of meaning has caused rhetoricians to look to
social science and cognitive studies to study the effects of metaphor in
communication. E.g., OWEN BARFIELD, POETIC DICTION: A STUDY IN MEANING 63-64
(1964); HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 152 (1992);
JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 695, 707 (1973); Haig Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of
Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection to
Students and Teachers, 15 J. L. & EDUC. 448 (1986); Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor,
supra note 76, at 135-38; Burr Henly, "Penumbra'" The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987); Edward L. Murray, The Phenomenon of the
Metaphor: Some Theoretical Considerations, 2 DUQ. STUD. IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 288 (A. Giorgi, C. Fischer & E. Murray eds., 1975); Steven L. Winter,
Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 759 (1992) (reviewing
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same way that contemporary law and economics looks to
cognitive studies and brain science for the same lessons in
audience reaction and motivation.
10 2
There are two rhetorical lessons to be drawn from this
observation. First, a single rhetorical approach to discourse may
miss the audience and fall short of the rhetorical situation.
Discourse should be crafted in layers, and by this I do not simply
mean the rhetoric-i, -2, or -3 levels pertaining to different
audiences, but rather the use of multiple layers using different
modes of persuasion directed toward the same audience for the
same level of rhetorical communication. Second, a writer should
consider pathos-based modes of persuasion, such as narrative
theory and storytelling modes, to target the values of the
audience in the situation and present a discourse that the
audience will identify and accept. In many instances, the writer
should not use pathos as the sole mode of persuasion, but should
consider it as one layer in the communication.
V. CONCLUSION
Law and economics is a fascinating school of contemporary
legal rhetoric. The particular combination of modes of persuasion
found in this rhetoric commands attention in two ways: by the
success with which the rhetoric of law and economics has
influenced the legal academy, and by the success with which it
has influenced American economic and financial policy in ways
that are now criticized after the experience of the Great
Recession. The former observation indicates the persuasive
power of this rhetoric-the elegance of mathematical formulas
used to demonstrate a theory of rational choice that allows laws
and regulations to be defined in tropes of incentives and costs so
as to justify what the legal economists have conceived of as
efficient results. This persuasive power has outshined many
THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY
(1991)).
102. Most, if not all, of the sources on behavioral law and economics indicate a
trend toward incorporating cognitive studies, and the most cutting edge of these
sources point toward new ways of understanding incentives and motivation through
brain science. See, e.g., John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, Understanding
Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational
Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 131 (2008); Terrence Chorvat, Kevin
McCabe, & Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35
(2005); Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1599 (2000).
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other schools of analysis within the legal academy. The latter,
post-Great Recession observation indicates that the theories and
assumptions of neoclassical law and economics-the efficiency of
unregulated markets, the near-religious-like devotion to a hyper-
simplified conception of rationality and self-interest with regard
to the persons and institutions participating in the financial
system, and a conception of laws and government policies as
incentives and costs in a manner that excludes the actual
externalities and complications of reality-not only force scholars
to cast doubt on the economic and financial prescriptions and
recommendations of neoclassical law and economics but also force
attention to the reasons why the rhetoric could be used for such
wrongs.
I have written this Article to answer the question posed by
the paradox of the success of the rhetoric of law and economics
and the failure of law and economics' economic and financial
theories in the Great Recession. In and of themselves, the topics
of invention and arrangement and the tropes of style of law and
economics are neither right or wrong, nor ethical or unethical.
The evaluation is determined by the author's motive. The forms
can be used in a rhetorical communicative and persuasive sense
to inspire imagination so as to further the understanding and
persuasion of the audience within the rhetorical situation, or the
forms can be used to confuse or to disguise the true issues of the
rhetorical situation or the true answers that might address these
issues in the service of some other political or economic agenda.
Law and economics rhetoric, like all rhetoric in legal discourse, is
not moral, immoral, or amoral in and of itself, but it provides
tools for authors to carry out their own moral, immoral, or amoral
motivations for communication. This observation is particularly
important for the topics and tropes of law and economics rhetoric
because these topics and tropes often are used to communicate
with and persuade audiences at a rhetoric-2 or rhetoric-3 level of
communication-in other words, to communicate with and
influence audiences who are not themselves experts in economics
or even law and economics.
Mathematical forms of invention and arrangement allow
reasoning that is open and demonstrative, following logical
structures used in mathematics, science, and legal reasoning that
allow falsification or verification of the reasoning and the results.
As such, these forms are justifiably convincing. They are
potentially convincing at any level of rhetorical communication.
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However, at a rhetoric-2 or rhetoric-3 level of communication,
especially when used as topics of arrangement or tropes of style,
mathematical formulas, charts, and diagrams can provide the
appearance of careful, calculated analysis that on its face appears
to have both scientific logic and certainty, but amounts to no
more than dressing up a non-mathematical analysis in the garb
of mathematics. If the task is to persuade, such uses for
arrangement or style might be used as a cudgel to overwhelm an
audience who is unlikely to be able to tease out the assumptions,
limitations, and variables that are obscured or confused by such a
presentation. The propriety of suggesting mathematical certainty
that is not genuine or obscuring the limitations of a line of
reasoning through charts and diagrams is questionable and
potentially unethical.
The topics and tropes associated with efficiency are on the
one hand simplistic and on the other complicated. The topic of
arrangement that calls for clear, concise, elegant communication
because it is superior to prolix, dense, overly-complicated
communication is a fairly safe and uncontroversial topic
supported by all schools of contemporary legal rhetoric. On the
other hand, the tropes of style that might attempt to carry out
definitions extracted from the economic concept of efficiency are
very discipline-specific, and do not automatically translate to
general legal discourse. Efficient elimination of waste or
reduction in costs is a fairly straightforward proposition, but the
concepts of Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 10 3 can be
counterintuitive and confusing if applied to non-economic topics
in law. They can confound understanding and block appropriate
persuasion.
With regard to the style tropes of incentives and costs, the
law has firmly embraced these metaphors and welcomed them
into the language of the law. No one will blush or object to legal
communications that purport to incentivize conduct or avoid
externalities or tax a certain behavior. The lesson for legal
rhetoricians is that it is important to be honest when they make
assumptions about what ends will be served by the incentives and
rewarded by the avoidance of costs. Economics rhetoric intends
to serve the end of efficiency, whichever definition of that concept
applies. In other areas of the law, pursuing the ends of efficiency
103. See Murray, Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 647
nn.105, 106, 107.
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alone might displace other values that might be preferred, if not
left off the table in service of an economic goal.
The lessons of modern cognitive studies, brain science, and
behavioral studies point the way to a future general legal rhetoric
that understands and targets heuristics and biases in honest,
appropriate manners, appealing correctly to the emotions that
are implicated by the rhetorical situation because the legal issue
at hand implicates the values that drive the emotions. The
storytelling movement in law and rhetoric aims to apply those
lessons directly in legal discourse. In many ways, the center of
gravity of the law and economics movement has progressed
beyond the overtly simplistic neoclassical conception of rational
choice. It would be anachronistic to continue beating the horse
that human behavior is more complicated than the neoclassical
conception of "rational equals pursuit of self-interest through
wealth-maximization." Much of contemporary law and economics
rhetoric is engaged in learning and applying the lessons of
modern cognitive studies, brain science, and behavioral studies so
that the assumptions made and the theories developed take into
account the lessons of effective communication and persuasion
that may be learned from these disciplines.
The Great Recession is the latest and greatest case study to
teach us that the topics of invention and arrangement and tropes
of style of law and economics have applications in legal discourse
beyond the economic analysis of law, but the topics and tropes are
subject to abuse and must be used ethically and with careful
regard to their propriety as a tool to create meaning and inspire
imagination, and not as a tool of deception or obfuscation within
the rhetorical situation at hand. This is a lesson for all
rhetoricians, those of law and economics and of general legal
discourse.
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